Parsons, Luhmann and the theorem of double contingency by Vanderstraeten, Raf
 Parsons, Luhmann and the Theorem of
Double Contingency
RAF VANDERSTRAETEN University of Bielefeld
ABSTRACT This article analyzes the ego/alter ego constellation of social inter-
action. Every social interaction constitutes a situation with double contingency,
which is recognized as such by both sides: both know that both know that one
could also act differently. The circularity of the relationship brings about inde-
terminacy; self-commitment would presuppose that others commit themselves
and vice versa. How is this infinity problem solved? How can we account for the
possibility of social interaction, and social order? Both Talcott Parsons and Niklas
Luhmann have devoted considerable attention to the theorem of double con-
tingency. Here, I analyze their theoretical formulations on this topic.
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Niklas Luhmann (1927–98) had a paradoxical relation with the classical tradition
in sociology. On the one hand, he never got tired of criticizing and taunting
contemporary sociology’s fascination for its founding fathers. In the preface to
Soziale Systeme (1984), for example, he bluntly asserts that sociology is stuck in a
theory crisis. The discipline offers old bottles into which the data of empirical
research are poured. ‘To a great extent, those interested in theory return to the
classical authors. . . . The task becomes one of dissecting, criticizing, and
recombining already-existing texts. What one does not trust oneself to do is
assumed to be already at hand’ (1995a: xlv). Here, as in other places, Luhmann
depicts explorations in the writings of key sociological thinkers as a poor
substitute for original theoretical research. The discipline would be better off
without ‘reliance on illustrious names and specialization in them’ (1995a: xlvi).
The dissection of each bit of the classical authors hardly contributes to the
development of sociological theory. In fact, it leads away from any concern with
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the distinctive characteristics of sociology as a scientific discipline. ‘If one dis-
members them in this way, however, can one manage without them?’ (1995a:
xlvi). The cynical tone of this rhetorical question seems to imply that new
theoretical projects should not be guided by the writings of the classical
authors.
For the development of his own theory of social systems, Luhmann
explored a number of other research contexts. His work especially draws on
writings in philosophy, general systems theory and cybernetics. In this sense, his
writings indeed diverge from the sociological tradition. On the other hand,
however, Luhmann typically identified himself as a ‘sociologist’, and presented his
work as ‘sociology’. He also justified his excursions outside the discipline in this
way: ‘[T]he advances in abstraction and the new conceptual formations that
already exist or are emerging in interdisciplinary contexts should be made usable
in sociological research’ (1995a: 11). Moreover, Luhmann even published his
own painstaking analyses of the writings of founding fathers of the discipline, such
as Max Weber and E´mile Durkheim (e.g. Luhmann, 1982: part 1). And both his
major books – namely Soziale Systeme (1984) and Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft
(1997) – are explicitly presented as a critical evaluation and modification of the
work of Talcott Parsons, that is, ‘the only systematic sociological theory that
currently exists’ (1997: 21). In this sense, his work can also be perceived as a
reflection on the discipline’s heritage, and as a contribution to classical discussions
in sociology (see Vanderstraeten, 2001b).1
In this paper, I want to focus on one foundational aspect of Luhmann’s
theory of social systems, namely the theorem of double contingency. Luhmann’s
analyses of double contingency take their starting-point from some classical
questions. How do two individuals who come face-to-face bridge the gap between
them and establish a relation to one another? How does the other-orientation in
each of the participants emerge and evolve in a social relation? How is action
coordination between ego and alter possible? In Luhmann’s systems theory, the
theorem of double contingency is introduced at a basic level to analyze the
emergence of social systems. But, as is well known, Talcott Parsons was the first to
name and give precise formulation to this theorem. Parsons already regarded
‘double contingency’ as a theoretical concept that is necessary to account for the
possibility of social interaction and, by extension, of social order. Luhmann’s analyses
are a systematic reconsideration of Parsons’ treatment of ‘the fundamental
proposition of the double contingency of interaction’ (Parsons, 1968: 436). In
order to explore Luhmann’s interpretations, it is therefore necessary to start with
a discussion of Parsons’ formulation of this fundamental theorem.
Talcott Parsons (1902–79) introduced the concept of double contingency
in 1951 in the almost simultaneously appearing Toward a General Theory of
Action, an anthology edited with Edward Shils, and The Social System.2 His
concept differentiates two aspects. On the one hand, double contingency draws
attention to the potential hazard of conflict between individuals confronting each
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other face-to-face; on the other hand, it points toward accomplishments that
could lead to cooperation and sharing. The doubly contingent situation is an
unavoidable basic condition that generates a problem at the social level that
requires a solution if social interaction and social order are to be possible. Parsons
takes the view that the norms and values of a ‘shared symbolic system’ solve the
basic problem of double contingency. In his theoretical framework, he made a
normative orientation – with the assumption of consensus – an indispensable
feature of any system of interaction (see Parsons, 1951: 36ff.; 1973). As I will
attempt to demonstrate, however, it is important to make the move from the
problem of double contingency to ideas about its solution with care. It is also at
this point that Luhmann’s and Parsons’ interpretations diverge.
In the introductory ‘General Statement’ of Toward a General Theory of
Action, Parsons et al. start their account of double contingency by distin-
guishing
. . . between objects which interact with the acting subject and those
objects which do not. These interacting objects are themselves actors or
egos. . . . They will be referred to as social objects or alters. A potential
food-object . . . is not an alter, because it does not respond to ego’s
expectations and because it has no expectations of ego’s action; another
person, a mother or a friend, would be an alter to ego. 
(1951: 14–15)
If another actor is treated as an interacting object, as an alter or alter ego, this
changes the picture in important regards. When one focuses on the interaction of
ego and alter, the analysis has to shift from the orientation of a single given actor
to the consideration of two or more interacting actors as a system. Parsons et al.
formulate their point of view as follows: ‘It is the fact that expectations operate on
both sides of the relation between a given actor and the object of his orientation
which distinguishes social interaction from orientation to nonsocial objects’
(1951: 15). Ego does not expect the behavior of a nonsocial object to be
influenced by expectations regarding his/her own behavior, although ego’s
behavior is influenced by his/her expectations concerning the behavior of the
nonsocial object. But the interaction of ego and alter is dependent on the
integration of the mutual expectations of both actors. Social interaction is basically
characterized by a ‘complementarity of expectations’ (Parsons et al., 1953:
35ff.).
Parsons’ point of departure is that ego will only be motivated to engage in
an interaction when ego can expect a constructive or gratifying reaction from alter
in the interaction. Owing to personal ‘need-dispositions’ and gratification inter-
ests, ego’s expectations will be oriented both to the range of alternatives for alter’s
actions, and to alter’s selection within this range of alternatives. And because
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alter’s reaction depends on what ego does, ego will have to interpret the meaning
of his/her own actions for alter.
In interaction ego and alter are each objects of orientation for the other.
The basic differences from orientations to nonsocial objects are two. First,
since the outcome of ego’s action (e.g. success in the attainment of a goal)
is contingent on alter’s reaction to what ego does, ego becomes oriented
not only to alter’s probable overt behavior but also to what ego interprets
to be alter’s expectations relative to ego’s behavior, since ego expects that
alter’s expectations will influence alter’s behavior. Second, in an integrated
system, this orientation to the expectations of the other is reciprocal or
complementary.
(Parsons and Shils, 1951: 105)
In other words, ego needs to expect the expectations of alter concerning ego’s
behavior. The obverse is true for alter. The expectations and actions of each of the
participants become oriented to the expectations and actions of the other.
The concept of ‘double contingency’ was introduced to define this basic
structure, and to distinguish interaction from other forms of action, such as the
instrumental manipulation of physical or biological objects. In the aforemen-
tioned ‘General Statement’ of Toward a General Theory of Action, Parsons et al.
employ the following formulation: 
There is a double contingency inherent in interaction. On the one hand,
ego’s gratifications are contingent on his selection among available alter-
natives. But in turn, alter’s reaction will be contingent on ego’s selection
and will result from a complementary selection on alter’s part.
(1951: 16)
In The Social System, Parsons (1951: 94) likewise identifies two ‘contingency
factors’ that result in double contingency, namely the contingency of what an
actor actually does in the context of an elementary interaction situation and the
contingency of the other’s reaction to what is being done. In interaction, one
might furthermore add, the determination of goals and actions transcends the
purely individual or subjective level. It becomes dependent on the interaction
process in which ego and alter participate. The ensuing, emergent order can then
be called a social system.
In later publications, Parsons has occasionally returned to this topic. In a
contribution to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, entitled
‘Social Interaction’, he states ‘the fundamental proposition’ of the double con-
tingency of social interaction in the following words: 
The crucial reference points for analyzing interaction are two: (1) that
each actor is both acting agent and object of orientation both to himself and
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to the others; and (2) that, as acting agent, he orients to himself and to
others and, as object, has meaning to himself and to others, in all of the
primary modes or aspects. The actor is knower and object of cognition,
utilizer of instrumental means and himself a means, emotionally attached
to others and an object of attachment, evaluator and object of evaluation,
interpreter of symbols and himself a symbol.
(1968: 436)
Strictly speaking, this elaborate formulation identifies a condition of double
‘double contingency’. There is double contingency for ego and for alter in
situations of social interaction. Parsons employs this formulation, on the one
hand, to distinguish once more between the action of isolated actors and the
interaction of two or more actors, and, on the other hand, to point to the
integration of the autonomy of ego and alter in a social system. The social system
of interaction itself also acquires autonomy. It becomes a reality sui generis
because of the condition of double contingency (1968: 437; see also Parsons,
1951: 24ff.).
The analysis of the internal structure of interaction reveals an immanent
circularity: Alter’s behavior depends on ego’s, and/while ego’s behavior depends
on alter’s. As Parsons points out clearly, this is not a problem of mere behavioral
agreement, or of coordinating the interests and intentions of different actors. It
concerns a basic condition of possibility for social action as such – for action cannot
take place if alter makes his action dependent on how ego acts, and ego wants to
connect his action to alter’s. In other words, the immanent circularity of the
condition of double contingency makes action indeterminable. One can then raise
questions such as: How do two actors who encounter each other in a situation of
interaction relate to one another? How are ego and alter able to expect each
other’s expectations? What allows the two actors to make a selection from among
available alternatives? How is interaction between ego and alter possible? Parsons’
classical solution for the problem of double contingency takes the form of cultural
determination. He argues that the long-term structures that regenerate social
order lie in a cultural inheritance, and thus in the past. Already available cultural
value patterns penetrate action orientations to such an extent that the existence of
a value consensus can be assumed in interaction situations. But is this the only
solution that is possible?
Let us first take a closer look on Parsons’ way of solving and eliminating
the problem of double contingency. In Toward a General Theory of Social Action,
Parsons and Shils focus their analysis on the neo-Kantian, transcendental question
of the minimal conditions of social stability. What is required to account for the
existence of social order? The starting-point of their analysis is that ego and alter
can only anticipate each other’s future expectations and actions when the alter-
natives open to alter ‘have some measure of stability in two respects: first, as
realistic possibilities for alter, and second, in their meaning to ego’ (1951: 105).
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From the perspective of ego’s ‘need-dispositions’ and gratification interests, alter’s
action alternatives must have more or less the same meaning in a range of
situations. The kind of meaning stability that Parsons has in mind presupposes
generalization from the particularity of the given situations of ego and alter. It
presupposes that action acquires a symbolic function that transcends the particular
situations of interaction. ‘When such generalization occurs, and actions, gestures,
or symbols have more or less the same meaning for both ego and alter, we may
speak of a common culture existing between them, through which their inter-
action is mediated’ (1951: 105). Thus conceived, culture functions as a medium
that can be employed by ego and alter in different social contexts.
Parsons also emphasizes that this common cultural or symbolic system
cannot merely be understood as a medium for the transmission of information. If
ego wants to be understood by alter, if ego wants to elicit constructive reactions,
ego will have to respect the conventions that regulate the use of symbols. This
type of solution for the ‘problem of order’ implies a normative orientation of the
behavior of the participants.
It will then be a condition of the stabilization of such a system of
complementary expectations, not only that ego and alter should commu-
nicate, but that they should react appropriately to each other’s action. A
tendency toward consistent appropriateness of reaction is also a tendency
toward conformity with a normative patterns. The culture is not only a set
of symbols of communication but a set of norms for action.
(Parsons and Shils, 1951: 106)
And in the article ‘Social Interaction’, Parsons chooses the following
formulation:
The most important single condition of the integration of an interaction
system is a shared basis of normative order. Because it must operate to
control the disruptive potentialities (for the system of reference) of the
autonomy of units . . . such a basis of order must be normative. It must
guide action by establishing some distinctions between desirable and
undesirable lines of action which can serve to stabilize interaction.
(1968: 437)
This concept of a shared basis of normative order is, in Parsons’ view, ‘basically the
same as that of a common culture’ (1968: 437).
Parsons’ position can be reconstructed as follows. When ego begins to
adopt an elementary orientation toward alter in an indeterminate interaction
situation, then ego engages in signification or symbolization. This means that ego
is bringing into play an expectation that necessarily involves abstraction or
generalization from the particularities of the situation. When alter now reacts to
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ego in contingency on ego’s proposal, alter also articulates an expectation and
thus engages in a further step of symbolization that reinforces the structuring
effect of the first symbolization step. Parsons argues that two actors (who have
already acquired a symbolic system) act and react in particular ways in a specific
situation such that they thereby activate relatively stable and more or less shared
cultural forms that give the situation a sufficiently abstract or generalized meaning
to make communication possible. At present, it can readily be seen that this
position and this type of solution for the problem of double contingency are based
on a past-oriented, objectivist and reified concept of culture (see Habermas, 1987:
204ff.; 1996: 139ff.; Strydom, 2001: 167ff.). The constitution of social systems is
bound to cultural forms that are always already on hand – but how can the
emergence and function of these forms themselves then be explained? Moreover,
the problem of social order becomes a problem of education, for interaction is
thought to depend on the correspondence between the expectations and norma-
tive orientations ego and alter have acquired through socialization and education.
But which concept of socialization is then employed (see Vanderstraeten,
2000)?
Even in his later works, Parsons continued to underline the regulative role
of culture and the importance of ‘socialization to the grounds of consensus’
(1966: 14).
The maintenance of a normative order requires that it be implemented in
a variety of respects: there must be very considerable – even if often quite
incomplete – compliance with the behavioral expectations established by
the values and norms. The most basic condition of such compliance is the
internalization of a society’s values and norms by its members, for such
socialization underlies the consensual basis of a societal community.
(1966: 14)
A discussion of the implications of this ‘oversocialized view of man’ would divert
us from the argument of this article (Parsons, 1962; Wrong, 1961). The point
that needs to be stressed here is that Parsons employs a negative conception of
double contingency. He identifies double contingency with the nonsocial, the
nonadapted. Parsons stresses the importance of values and norms, because this
symbolic order is able to regenerate social order and to eliminate the basic problem
of double contingency (see also Parsons & Bales, 1956: 195). However, one
might ask whether the basic problem in the constitution of interaction really lies in
eliminating what is harmful or cannot adapt. In Luhmann’s words: ‘Is it enough
to conceive social order as a boycotting of boycotting, or must one not know
from the beginning how it is generally possible and sufficiently probable?’ (1995a:
116). As Luhmann indicates, the problem that Parsons bequeaths to contempo-
rary social theory is in the first place the problem of a ‘postmodern’ account of the
basic condition of social interaction.
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The concept of double contingency is especially prominently positioned in
Luhmann’s book Soziale Systeme (1984), which became available in English in
1995 under the title Social Systems.3 The third chapter of this book is entirely
devoted to a discussion of the concept. It forms the nexus between Luhmann’s
reflections on a general theory of systems and his detailed presentation of the
armamentarium of a theory of social systems. ‘The concept that is the theme of
this chapter leads directly into the theory of social systems’ (1995a: 103).
Building on the foundations laid by Parsons, Luhmann discusses double con-
tingency as a problem that motivates the constitution of social systems. He
acknowledges that a completely indeterminate situation (i.e. ‘pure’ double con-
tingency) never occurs in our societal reality. It can only be conceived as a kind of
conceptual ‘limit’. But, in contrast to Parsons, Luhmann is interested in the
potential positive aspects of double contingency. He argues that the condition of
double contingency cannot be neutralized or eliminated if social interaction is
conceived as the confrontation of at least two autonomous systems (ego and
alter). It is a problem that is constantly regenerated in social interaction, and thus
imbues social systems with a basic instability (see Baecker, 2001: 66ff.; Blom,
1997: 112ff.; Vanderstraeten, 2002).
Luhmann’s reformulation of the theorem of double contingency is first of
all based on a broader definition of the concept of contingency. In Parsons’ work,
‘contingent’ is predominantly used in the sense of ‘dependent on . . .’ The double
contingent character of social interaction refers to the mutual dependency of ego’s
and alter’s expectations and actions. Thus defined, it is indeed obvious to see the
solution for the problem in forms of mutual restraint, of conformity to basic rules,
and of the internalization of common cultural values. In contrast with this
perspective, Luhmann returns to the original interpretation of contingency in
modal theory (Aristotle).
Contingency means that being depends on selection which, in turn,
implies the possibility of not being and the being of other possibilities. A
fact is contingent when seen as selection from other possibilities which
remain in some sense possibilities despite a selection. 
(Luhmann, 1976: 509)
The concept describes ‘something given (something experienced, expected,
remembered, fantasized) in the light of its possibly being otherwise; it describes
objects within the horizon of possible variations’ (Luhmann, 1995a: 106).4 This
means that ego’s action is not contingent while it depends on another actor, but
while it presupposes a selection from a range of alternative options. The double
contingent character of social interaction is, mutatis mutandis, a consequence not
of the mutual dependency of ego and alter, but of the confrontation of at least
two autonomous systems that make their own selections in relation to one
another. Luhmann (1981: 14) makes clear that dependency can be a consequence
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of this confrontation of ego and alter, but that dependency can also exactly be
avoided in this confrontation.
This more abstract and broader theoretical reformulation rules out
approaches that try to solve the problem of double contingency (even when it
does not call it that) with concepts like reflection, symmetry, reciprocity or
complementarity of perspectives. The unity being sought cannot merely be seen as
a kind of ‘stapling together’ of what is different. That way, one would under-
estimate the complexity of the relationship of ego and alter, and the emerging
‘eigen-selectivity’ of this social system. Luhmann’s critique is especially directed
against the work of George H. Mead – notwithstanding Parsons’ positive
discussion of Mead as a classic author on this topic (Parsons, 1968: 434–5).
Symbolic interactionism builds a contingently acting alter into ego and sees, quite
correctly, the process of mediation as the use of symbols. But it treats the problem
only on one side of the interaction, assuming that all is the same on the other. It
treats, so to speak, only half of the double contingency. It confines itself to ego’s
actions, reflections, expectations and anticipations. Social systems emerge
‘through (and only through) the fact that both partners experience double
contingency and that the indeterminability of such a situation for both partners in
any activity that then takes place possesses significance for the formation of
structures’ (Luhmann, 1995a: 108). This new unity cannot be grasped via the
concept of action – as Mead, Parsons and others use it – because a constitutive
feature of action is that it must be attributable to individuals. It can only be
grasped via the concept of communication.
Luhmann argues that the complexity of social systems rules out the
participants’ reciprocally fully understanding each other; it rules out under-
standing every variant of system performance that each one individually con-
templates. The participants are opaque and incalculable to one another. Hence,
one can also talk of ego and alter as black boxes. ‘The basic situation of double
contingency is then simple: two black boxes, by whatever accident, come to have
dealings with one another’ (1995a: 109). These black boxes cannot really
understand each other, but they can create sufficient transparency or ‘whiteness’
for dealing with one another.
For the few aspects through which they deal with one another, their
capacity for processing information can suffice. They remain separate; they
do not merge. . . . They concentrate on what they can observe as input and
output in the other as a system in an environment. . . . They can try to
influence what they observe by their own action and can learn further from
the feedback. In this way an emergent order can arise that is conditioned
by the complexity of the systems that make it possible but that does not
depend on this complexity’s being calculated or controlled.
(1995a: 110; see also 1990: 52ff.)
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Or, as Ranulph Glanville (1982) aptly entitled his study on the foundations of
cybernetics: ‘Inside every white box there are two black boxes trying to get
out.’
Luhmann underlines that if an ego experiences an alter as alter ego and
acts in this experiential context, his/her action becomes almost automatically an
action ‘for you’, ‘against you’ or ‘in front of you’. This means that ego’s action
controls itself from the perspective of the alter ego. This ego/alter ego constella-
tion forms the nucleus of social interaction. To what extent the individual black
boxes ‘really’ play a part in the interaction is another question. It is now well
known that interaction allows for various forms of ‘presentation of self ’ (Goffman,
1959; see also Kieserling, 1999). In a more or less similar way, Luhmann (1995b:
142ff.; 1997: 642ff.) maintains that there exist various forms and degrees of
‘personalization’ of social systems. This notion expresses the dependence of the
social system on the personal attributions of the participants. It indicates not only
that the degree of reciprocal knowledge required to reproduce the social system
varies with the type of social system, but also that social systems themselves create
the transparency sufficient for reciprocal observation and communication. One
can think, for example, of the different forms of personalization in family
relationships (love, education), on the one hand, and during shopping in super-
markets or fast-food restaurants, on the other. These examples also indicate that
what is possible and necessary in interaction systems depends on the variety of
types that emerge in the course of sociocultural evolution (see Vanderstraeten,
2001a).
Let us now consider in a more systematic way the implications of
Luhmann’s reformulation of the problem of double contingency for his con-
ceptualization of its solution. If everyone acts contingently and thus everyone
could also act differently and knows this about him- or herself and others and
takes it into account, it is, for the moment, improbable that one’s own action will
generally find points of connection (and with them a conferral of meaning) in the
actions of others. The circularity of the relationship brings about indeterminacy;
self-commitment would presuppose that others commit themselves and vice versa.
‘As long as ego cannot act without knowing how alter will act and vice versa, the
system is underdetermined and thereby blocked.’ But, so Luhmann adds, ‘for
meaning systems this means at the same time becoming highly sensitive to almost
any determination’ (1995a: 131). In a sense, the problem thus incorporates its
own solution. In contrast to Parsons, Luhmann believes that this solution is not
dependent on the existence of social consensus. The solution relies first of all on
the temporal aspects of social interaction.
Beginning is easy. Strangers begin by reciprocally signalling each other
indications of the most important behavioral foundations: the definition of
the situation, social status, intentions. This initiates a system history that
includes as well as reconstructs the problem of contingency. As a result,
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the system increasingly is occupied with arguments about a self-created
reality: with handling facts and expectations that the system itself has
helped to create.
(1995a: 131–2)
After the first steps, double contingency is no longer given in its original, circular
indeterminacy. Every new step still appears as ‘being also otherwise possible’ – but
only against the background of what has already been determined.
Luhmann does not resort to ab extra solutions for the problem of double
contingency in interaction. He argues that the appearance of the problem comes
to initiate a process of solving it; this solution is not founded in human nature, or
regulated by cultural values that have prior validity.
What the experience of contingency achieves is the constitution and
opening up of chance for conditioning functions within the system, thus,
the transformation of chance into structural probabilities. Everything else
is a question of selecting what proves its worth and what has further
usefulness.
(1995a: 120)
In this line of reasoning, the experience of double contingency creates a sensitivity
to chance. Everything that happens in such a situation, every action, every
gesture, every expression, appears as a relevant, meaningful selection. After the
first gesture, every subsequent step becomes an action with a contingency-
reducing effect – be it positive or negative. The initial situation constitutes a take-
off situation. The open or pure, undetermined version of double contingency –
ego will do what alter wants if alter does what ego wants – is supplemented by a
structured version that takes into account determinations and alternatives, and
that gets constituted in the process of interaction. ‘The system emerges, etsi non
daretur Deus [even if God doesn’t exist]’ (1995a: 105).
This point of view implies that social interaction constantly reproduces its
own double contingent character. Following Luhmann, social systems use double
contingency as stimulus for the restructuring or reconditioning of their own
processes. He speaks of ‘auto-catalysis’ in social systems. ‘Thus the problem of
double contingency has the properties of an autocatalytic factor: without itself
being “consumed”, it enables the construction of structures on a new level of
ordering, which is regulated by that perspective on perspectives. Thereby – and
this is why one can speak of “auto”-catalysis – the problem of double contingency
is itself a component of the system that it forms’ (1995a: 120). The experience of
contingency gives rise to the formation of a social system, but this experience
depends itself on the generation of meaningful issues in the social system. Seen in
this light, research about the very origins of social order looses its relevance.
‘Persons never meet without some assumption, without some expectations about
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each other, and they can experience contingency in the sense of “always being
otherwise possible” only by means of behavioral types and expectations’ (1995a:
133). It can now also be understood why Luhmann chooses to emphasize the
positive role of double contingency. His elaborations are first of all intended to
enable the development of an armamentarium for the analysis of social phenom-
ena such as instability, dissent, change, and evolution. One might also say that his
elaborations try to deconstruct the usual notion of system – and to do away with
any presumptions of hierarchical control, order, or predictability (Luhmann,
1997: 36ff; see Baecker, 2001). In this sense, I have previously spoken of a
‘postmodern’ account of social order.
For Luhmann, double contingency is a pre-eminent social problem. The
solution of this problem requires the use of a pre-eminent social operation,
namely communication. Social order can only be produced by means of commu-
nication, although/while it is this order that also enables communication. Luh-
mann’s social systems theory incorporates self-reference; his communication
theory is explicitly concerned with the exploration of this self-referential constitu-
tion of social order (e.g. Luhmann, 1982: 59–63). In this regard, one can once
more see that Luhmann’s account of double contingency sharply diverges from
Talcott Parsons’ account. For Parsons, social order eventually has a nonsocial
origin. Ego and alter apparently solve the problem of double contingency not by
communication, but by introspection. One way or another, each of the partici-
pants comes to recognize the necessity of shared norms and values. The founda-
tions of social order are located in individual willingness and individual reason,
even if socialization plays a crucial role for the ‘social animal’ (Luhmann, 1981:
13–16). For Luhmann, however, the condition of double contingency initiates
communication, and this communication inevitably constitutes a social system as a
network of meaningful reciprocal selections – which reproduces the very problem
of double contingency.
Against this background, it can be seen that the condition of double
contingency enforces the differentiation of social systems and human beings.
Social systems are emergent realities that use communication to process meaning.
They consist of communications, not of human beings (the term indicates both
the psychic and the organic systems of human beings). Human beings are part of
the social environment, and vice versa. But the differentiation of social and psychic
systems is not equal to mutual isolation. Communications can be at the same time
conscious events; thoughts can be communicated. These systems can converge or
‘interpenetrate’ in individual elements, because they are radically temporalized
systems. Their elements are continually replaced by other elements or ‘events’
(different thoughts, different communications). ‘They give each of them a
different selectivity and connectivity, different pasts and futures. . . . The elements
signify different things in the participating systems, although they are identical as
elements: they select among different possibilities and lead to different con-
sequences’ (Luhmann, 1995a: 215). For human beings, the so-called ‘turn-
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taking’ of active and passive participation in communication almost inevitably
re-establishes the difference between psychic and social systems. The mind might,
for example, wander, think of something incommunicable, interrupt or pause,
while the burden of communicating passes to somebody else. On the other hand,
psychic systems do not have to accept what is communicated, or how it is
communicated. They can reject the communicative events (Vanderstraeten,
2000). In this sense, Luhmann clearly provides us with an account of social
systems as a reality sui generis.
Finally, it should be noted that Luhmann’s elaborations are directed
against the moralistic schemes of observation that dominate in the field of the
social sciences. With Talcott Parsons and other ‘critical theorists’ of the New
World in mind, Luhmann made a number of cynical remarks in Die Gesellschaft
der Gesellschaft: 
To an astonishing degree and more than all others, American sociology has
positioned itself to stand up for the Good and to accept the Bad, at best, as
a form of ‘deviance’ that should be the target of social reform efforts. It
perfectly copies the classic story of American movies: the Good has a
terrible time, it almost fails against its adversaries; but in the end it
triumphs against all odds, drives off in a shiny new car and gets a well-
earned kiss.
(1997: 1130)
Sociology has established itself as a ‘science of crises’ – and, as a consequence, has
become trapped in its own theory crisis (1997: 1132). Its research agenda has
become second to the adopted moral agenda. Instead of trying to offer a
moralistic scheme to the rest of the world, sociology should concentrate on the
deconstruction of common, self-evident perspectives. From Luhmann’s per-
spective, social systems theory looks at communicating and observing in society;
and from here it gradually reconstructs how time directs our doings and how we
risk our presentations of self in interaction with others.
In this article, I have indicated that double contingency is always regen-
erated during the process of social interaction. Strictly speaking, the problem of
double contingency is a problem that cannot be solved. Luhmann’s elegant
solution is possible because his analysis takes as its point of departure the
autonomy of social systems. Only complex psychic systems (i.e. black boxes) in
the environment of the social system are able to regenerate the experience of
contingency. Because ‘the theory deals with a free-floating reality, a self-
grounding enterprise’ (1995a: 123), social order can only be created in the social
world itself. It is on the basis of this presumption that Luhmann tried to provide
a theoretical framework for the analysis of the fundamental features common to all
social systems.
VANDERSTRAETEN  DOUBLE CONTINGENCY 89
Notes
The author acknowledges funding by the European Commission (HPMF-CT-2000–00835).
1. In a discussion of E´mile Durkheim’s The Division of Labor in Society, Luhmann has proposed the
following understanding of classical texts in sociology: 
The text retains its contemporary relevance so long as its way of posing problems can still
be accepted. However, it remains an authoritative standard in an ambivalent sense: from
it we can infer what must be achieved, but no longer how it is to be achieved.
(1982: 4)
A text is classical if it furnishes a set of claims that is no longer convincing in its original form, but
that survives as a challenge, desideratum or problem. While its formulation of a particular problem
survives, its solution for that problem is no longer acceptable. It is also in this sense, by drawing a
distinction between problem and solution, that I discuss the theorem of double contingency.
2. Perhaps it is not redundant to point here to the fact that Toward a General Theory of Action
sought to introduce the development of general theory in the social sciences (sociology,
psychology and cultural anthropology). The book was a joint product of several outstanding
researchers: Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Edward C. Tolman, Gordon W. Allport, Clyde
Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, Robert R. Sears, Richard C. Sheldon and Samuel A. Stouffer. They all
contributed to the book’s introductory ‘General Statement’.
3. This 675-page work was conceived as ‘the introductory chapter’ of his theory of society. In a
number of other monographs, this general theory of social systems has been applied to function
systems of our contemporary society (economy, science, law, art, religion, politics and education).
Luhmann’s chef d’oeuvre is the 1200-page book Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997), which
appeared one year before his death. Here, Luhmann presented the final chapter of his theory of
society.
4. An action is also defined by the set of possibilities from which it is selected. That is why Luhmann,
with reference to phenomenology (Edmund Husserl), also speaks of the ‘horizon’ of possible
references made expectable by every action.
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